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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1394 
_____________ 
 
CAROLINE DELLAPENNA, 
      Appellant 
 
v. 
 
TREDYFFRIN/EASTTOWN SCHOOL DISTRICT,  
DANIEL WATERS, and MICHAEL AZZARA. 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cv-06110) 
 District Judge:  Hon. Timothy J. Savage 
_____________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 27, 2011 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR. and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  October 28, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge. 
Caroline Gu Dellapenna appeals the order of the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment to the Tredyffrin/Easttown School 
District and its employees, Daniel Waters and Michael Azzara, (collectively, “TESD”) on 
2 
 
her claims of employment discrimination and retaliation. Invoking Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 
P.S. § 951 (“PHRA”), Dellapenna contends that TESD fired her as its director of finance 
because of her race, gender, and national origin, and because she complained about 
discrimination. After reviewing the record, we conclude that Dellapenna’s evidence falls 
far short of supporting claims of employment discrimination or retaliation. We will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and the 
proceedings in the District Court, we will revisit them only briefly. Caroline Gu 
Dellapenna is a naturalized American citizen originally from China. TESD hired her as 
Controller in 1996, promoted her to Director of Finance in June 2006, and terminated her 
in January 2007. Among her other obligations at TESD, Dellapenna was responsible for 
preparing the district’s annual financial report.  
At the end of June 2006, shortly after Dellapenna’s tenure as finance director 
began, TESD’s outside auditor uncovered a range of accounting irregularities, including 
over a million dollars of overstated accrued expenses. In September 2006 Michael 
Azzara, TESD’s Chief Operations Officer and Dellapenna’s supervisor, was informed by 
the personnel director about disconcerting complaints regarding Dellapenna’s 
performance. Specifically, two employees working under Dellapenna had alleged that she 
regularly abused and berated her staff while instructing them to use improper accounting 
methods. Azzara subsequently interviewed the staff members and documented their 
grievances.  
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Based on the above, and suspecting Dellapenna of having committed fraud, TESD 
hired a forensic accountant to audit Dellapenna’s work on October 9, 2006. Michael 
Waters, the district superintendent, informed Dellapenna that members of her staff had 
voiced grievances regarding her professional and interpersonal conduct. Waters advised 
her that he would discuss these allegations fully upon the completion of the district’s 
annual financial report. Several days later, Dellapenna requested documentation of the 
complaints against her. Waters reiterated that he would await the completion of the 
annual financial report before discussing the allegations.  
On November 21, 2006, Dellapenna complained to Waters about statements she 
had overheard Azzara make on the telephone, in which he allegedly accused her of fraud. 
She requested an investigation into Azzara’s conduct. Waters agreed to review these 
accusations as well after the annual financial report was complete. On December 15, 
2006, Dellapenna again complained about similar comments she had overheard Azzara 
make during another telephone conversation. 
On December 20, 2006, Waters finally met with Dellapenna to discuss her staff’s 
allegations about her “demeaning and humiliating treatment.” App. 00583-00585, 00374-
00375. Shortly thereafter, the independent auditor concluded that no fraud had occurred. 
Instead, the auditor found, the accounting department’s procedures were not “in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles,” Dellapenna was “aware” of 
this, and she intentionally flouted prevailing accounting methods without the school 
district’s knowledge or approval. App. 00689-00703. The auditor concluded that the 
accounting department was “dysfunctional,” Dellapenna and her staff maintained “poor 
communication,” “personality conflict issues” abounded, and that this dysfunction 
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needed to be addressed before the accounting department could perform its appointed 
tasks adequately. Id. 
On January 5, 2007, the day after the auditor released this report, Dellapenna 
complained to Waters that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment and was 
mistreated because of her “age, gender, race, and/or ethnic background.” App. 00882. In 
accordance with school district policy, Waters referred Dellapenna’s grievances to an ad 
hoc committee. On January 16, 2007, Dellapenna again complained to the school district, 
stating that Azzara’s previous statements regarding her accounting methods were 
groundless. She raised no new claims or evidence regarding discrimination.  
On January 25, 2007, the school district sent Dellapenna a summary of the ad hoc 
committee’s review of her complaints. The committee concluded that Azzara’s telephone 
conversations were not motivated by discrimination and noted that Dellapenna had failed 
to offer any evidence of discrimination notwithstanding the district’s requests that she do 
so. The committee also concluded that Dellapenna’s “substantial misconduct” justified 
her termination. In a letter sent on January 26, 2007, Waters informed Dellapenna that 
TESD was firing her for cause, based on her “willful, wanton and/or gross misconduct as 
well as material and substantial dishonesty.” App. 00773. Waters advised Dellapenna that 
she had a right to a hearing. She declined the invitation, even though Waters informed her 
that a failure to request a hearing would result in her immediate discharge.  
Dellapenna filed a complaint in the District Court, alleging race, gender, and age 
discrimination, as well as unlawful retaliation under Title VII and the PHRA.
1
 On 
January 13, 2011, the District Court granted summary judgment to TESD, concluding 
that Dellapenna’s evidence did not satisfy the prima facie requirements for a 
                                              
1
 Dellapenna has since dismissed her age discrimination claims. 
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discrimination claim. Even if such a prima facie case could be made, moreover, the 
District Court found that TESD had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
its actions, and Dellapenna had failed to show that these reasons were a pretext for 
discrimination. The Court also found Dellapenna’s allegations of hostile work 
environment and retaliation meritless. Dellapenna filed a timely appeal.  
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment, applying the same legal standard” as it should have. Vitalo 
v. Cabot Corp., 399 F.3d 536, 542 (3d Cir. 2005). A party is entitled to summary 
judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(a), Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. We view the record in the light most favorable to Dellapenna and draw 
all reasonable inferences in her favor. See Vitalo, 399 F.3d at 542. We apply this standard 
with “added rigor in employment discrimination cases, where intent and credibility are 
crucial issues.” Stewart v. Rutgers State Univ., 120 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 1997) (citation 
omitted). To defeat summary judgment, however, Dellapenna must “show[] that the 
materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Rule 56(c)(1)(B). 
This requires showing something more than the “mere existence of a scintilla of 
evidence” for elements on which she bears the burden of production. Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). “An inference based upon speculation or 
conjecture does not create a material fact.” Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 
360, 382 n.12 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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III. 
Dellapenna contends that TESD violated Title VII and the PHRA by firing her 
because of her gender, race, and national origin, and because she complained about such 
discrimination.
2
 Because the evidence, even when construed in Dellapenna’s favor, does 
not support claims of discrimination or retaliation, we will affirm the District Court’s 
grant of summary judgment. We address both of Dellapenna’s contentions in turn. 
A.  
Dellapenna first contends that she was discriminated against and ultimately fired 
because of discriminatory animus based on her race, national origin, and gender. As 
Dellapenna lacks direct evidence of this discrimination, her claim falls under the burden-
shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of demonstrating a prima 
facie case of unlawful discrimination or retaliation. See id. at 802. If the plaintiff 
succeeds, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. Id. Once the employer meets this “relatively 
light burden,” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994), the burden of 
production returns to the plaintiff, who can defeat summary judgment only by showing 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s stated reason is pretextual. See id. 
Accordingly, once an employer has stated a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason, the 
                                              
2
 Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).  Title 
VII also prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because she has 
opposed an unlawfully discriminatory employment practice. See id. § 2000e-3(a).  
Claims arising under the PHRA are governed by the same standards set forth in Title VII 
for determining summary judgment motions. See Jones v. School Dist. of Phila., 198 
F.3d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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plaintiff must produce evidence that either “(1) casts sufficient doubt upon each of the 
legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably 
conclude that each reason was a fabrication; or (2) allows the factfinder to infer that 
discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of” the 
termination. Id. at 762. Because the ultimate issue is whether “discriminatory animus 
motivated the employer,” it is not enough to show that the employer made a “wrong or 
mistaken” decision. Id. at 765 (citations omitted). Rather, the plaintiff must uncover 
“weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” in the 
employer’s explanations that would permit a reasonable factfinder to believe that the 
employer did not actually act for its stated reasons. Id.  
In applying this framework here, Dellapenna’s contentions fall short at each step 
of the McDonnell Douglas framework: she raises no issue of material fact with respect to 
her prima facie case nor TESD’s allegedly pretextual reasons for firing her. 
1. 
For Dellapenna’s prima facie case of intentional discrimination, she must show 
that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) 
she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the school district treated similarly 
situated persons who are not members of the protected class—i.e., persons who behaved 
like Dellapenna but who are neither female, ethnically Chinese, nor from China—more 
favorably than her. See Jones, 198 F.3d at 410-411; see also Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
352 F.3d 789, 797-798 (3d Cir. 2003). Because some cases of discrimination involve a 
plaintiff who can find no similarly situated persons, Dellapenna may also meet her 
burden on the fourth element—the only one in dispute here—by producing evidence of a 
“causal nexus between the harm suffered and [her] membership in a protected class, from 
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which a reasonable juror could infer, in light of common experience, that [TESD] acted 
with discriminatory intent.” Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 275 (3d 
Cir. 2010). 
We are not persuaded that Dellapenna has made a prima facie case of 
discrimination. First, Dellapenna has not submitted any evidence that the school district 
treated any male or non-Chinese employee more favorably than her, much less a 
“similarly situated” one who improperly discharged his job responsibilities and 
mistreated subordinates. Second, although Dellapena is entitled to rely on a “broad array 
of evidence” in demonstrating a causal link between her protected status and her 
termination, Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 302 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation 
omitted), she has failed to show that such a link exists.
3
 Dellapenna points almost solely 
to the timing of her firing to establish the requisite causal nexus. Specifically, she 
contends that her January 5, 2007, letter complaining about discrimination and her 
subsequent firing 14 days later compel an inference of discriminatory intent, not just 
retaliation. Although a close temporal proximity between events may, in some instances, 
suffice to show a causal link, see id., we cannot ignore the overwhelming weight of the 
                                              
3
 Dellapenna contends that she has satisfied the causation element because TESD hired a 
white male to replace her, citing Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 
933, 939 (3d Cir. 1997), which permitted a plaintiff to show a causal nexus with evidence 
that her position was filled by a person not belonging to the protected class. To the extent 
Dellapenna contends that Matczak makes this fact dispositive, she is mistaken. Matczak 
reinforces the simple notion that we do not “woodenly” demand proof of disparate 
treatment for a prima facie case, but instead may look to “alternative” evidence—such as 
a replacement’s gender and race—in our search for a causal nexus. Id. Although 
Dellapenna’s replacement’s race and gender inform our causal nexus analysis, they do 
not control it. Matczak and Anderson, 621 F.3d at 275, merely hold that we should not 
dismiss a case solely because of a technical failure to show disparate treatment, but 
should examine whether other evidence is indicative of discriminatory causation. Here, 
neither Dellapenna’s replacement nor any other evidence raises an inference of a causal 
nexus between her race, gender, or national origin and her termination. 
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undisputed evidence that countervails any causal relationship between Dellapenna’s 
gender, race, or national origin and her termination. The school district began scrutinizing 
Dellapenna’s managerial and accounting practices in October. By that point, an audit had 
already uncovered rampant accounting errors. Her subordinates had lodged several 
complaints about her. And an independent firm found her management during this period 
to be so deficient that her department deserved the label “dysfunctional.” That 
Dellapenna lodged allegations after her employment was in obvious peril does not, in 
itself, create a plausible inference of a connection between her protected status and her 
firing. Moreover, even if her last-minute allegations were somehow connected to her 
firing, such a fact would go to her retaliation claim, not her prima facie discrimination 
claim.  
At bottom, there is nothing in the record suggesting that Dellapenna was fired 
because of her race, national origin, or gender. Dellapenna instead submits for our 
consideration only her subjective suspicions of discrimination, which are not sufficient to 
create an issue of material fact. See Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 
n.12 (3d Cir. 1990); cf. Waggoner v. Garland, 987 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir. 1993). 
Dellapenna simply has not “shown that the materials cited do not establish the absence 
. . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). We therefore agree with the District 
Court that Dellapenna has not satisfied her burden of showing a prima facie instance of 
discrimination. 
B. 
Although Dellapenna’s failure to make a prima facie case alone justifies summary 
judgment, we will briefly address the remaining two McDonnell Douglas steps for 
thoroughness. TESD has clearly articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for 
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firing Dellapenna: she verbally abused her staff, intentionally misstated accounting 
records, and ordered her subordinates to do the same. These legitimate reasons shift the 
burden to Dellapenna to prove pretext. See Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 
2007). To defeat summary judgment, Dellapenna must produce evidence from which a 
factfinder could reasonably either disbelieve TESD’s legitimate reasons, or believe that 
discrimination was more likely than not a motivation for her termination. See id. 
Dellapenna has not highlighted any evidence that could reasonably support an 
inference of pretext. She relies heavily on a comment Azzara allegedly made, in which he 
said that “his wife does not work and he brings the bacon home and he likes it that way.” 
Dellapenna v. Tredyffrin/Eastown Sch. Dist., No. 09-6110, 2011 WL 130156, at *8 (E.D. 
Pa. Jan. 13, 2011). Dellapenna has framed this statement to mean that Azzara has a 
prejudice against working women. This comment’s probativeness of Azzara’s anti-
woman animus is marginal; its probativeness that decisionmakers in the school district 
harbored discriminatory intent is nil. Azzara had no decisionmaking authority vis-à-vis 
Dellapenna’s termination. See App. 00607, 00656. Rather, the school board fired 
Dellapenna after she refused a hearing. See id. at 00810. We do not afford much weight 
to stray remarks made by nondecisionmakers. See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., 191 F.3d 
344, 359 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Moreover, the contention that Azzara’s accusations of fraud are somehow 
probative of unlawful discrimination and pretext borders on frivolous. Dellapenna does 
not even attempt to tie together the logical links required to show how allegations of 
fraud point to a discriminatory intent. She instead merely speculates that she “cannot 
imagine why he [would say this], other than, . . . because of [her] age, [her] race, [her] 
gender and [her] national origin.” App. at 00392-00393. Absent evidence that Azzara 
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treated other similarly situated employees differently, these alleged statements, if real, 
relate solely to Dellapenna’s job performance, not her protected status. Dellapenna points 
to several other employee interactions to prove this element, but none of this evidence 
could support even the faintest inference of pretext. As her accusations about Azzara’s 
comments exemplify, the entirety of Dellapenna’s pretext “evidence” constitutes nothing 
more than conjectures of discrimination conjured from otherwise routine workplace 
interactions between supervisors and a recalcitrant subordinate. Especially in the face of 
the school district’s unrebutted evidence of her abysmal performance as Director of 
Finance, Dellapenna’s remaining accusations deserve no further discussion, as mere 
speculation does not create genuine issues of material fact. See Robertson, 914 F.2d at 
382 n.12 (3d Cir. 1990). Dellapenna has not met the light burden of McDonnell Douglas 
and Rule 56(a) in showing pretext. Summary judgment was appropriate.  
IV. 
We further hold that Dellapenna’s contentions regarding retaliation are baseless. 
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Dellapenna must show that: (1) she engaged 
in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link 
exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Jalil v. Avdel 
Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989). Again, only the last element is now in 
contention. We conclude that Dellapenna has failed to sustain a prima facie claim of 
retaliation because she does not demonstrate how her firing was causally related to her 
complaints of discrimination. As a result, we agree with the District Court that 
Dellapenna cannot maintain a prima facie case of retaliation.   
Similar to the framework we impose on a discrimination claim, Dellapenna must 
show that her termination was motivated by her complaints. See Moore v. City of Phila., 
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461 F.3d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 2006). If she succeeds, she must then show that the district’s 
stated reason for firing her is pretextual. Id. Dellapenna misses the mark at both steps. 
She cannot show that her firing at the end of a months-long investigation into her 
accounting practices was the result of a complaint she made after the investigation had 
begun. Indeed, the record shows that Azzara did not learn of Dellapenna’s complaints 
about him until after she had already left the school district, see App. 00256, 00711, nor 
did Waters know that he had also been accused of discriminating against Dellapenna until 
the inception of this lawsuit, see id. at 00664-00665. Furthermore, even if Dellapenna 
could make out a prima facie case of retaliation, she would be unable to defeat summary 
judgment on the issue of pretext. As discussed above, the school district had ample 
reason to terminate Dellapenna. Dellapenna’s speculations to the contrary create no 
issues of material fact.  
IV. 
Having examined the facts in the light most favorable to Dellapenna and drawn all 
reasonable inferences in her favor, we agree with the District Court that there is 
insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Appellees had 
discriminated against Dellapenna because of her race, national origin, or gender. Because 
judgment as a matter of law was appropriate, we will AFFIRM the judgment of the 
District Court. 
 
